The Space of ReasonsThe Space of ReasonsBlog Devoted to Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind
Articles:
1, 2
Articles
Naturalised Epistemology: Quine vs Stroud (Part 2)
2007-07-23 11:31:00 In his notoriously laconic reply to Stroud, Quine treats Stroud's dilemma as merely an instantiation of the sceptical worry that reality might be very different from how we perceive it to be. If the first horn of the dilemma, that science is wrong, obtains then it naturally follows that reality is not as we perceive it to be. If the second horn of the dilemma, that all our theories are merely unverifiable posits, obtains then there is no way for us to rule out the possibility that reality is not as we perceive it to be. Both horns of Stroud's dilemma, then, amount to the sceptical worry. I take this conclusion to be uncontroversial, and I will therefore treat a successful reply to the sceptical worry as a successful reply to Stroud's dilemma.Quine maintains that the meaning of words is determined by their usage within a linguistic community. When we say: "there is a spoon," we are simply referring to a certain set of sensory stimulation’s to which our linguistic community has i... More About: Part , Epistemology , Ural , Stem
Back in Scotland
2007-07-19 17:15:00 I’m finally back in Scotland , after my all too brief Caribbean adventure, and will be submitting my M.Phil dissertation in less than a month. Very exciting times. This is also a sad time since I will soon be saying goodbye to St Andrews. I begin my PhD at Columbia University in September, which I am eagerly looking forward to. And while we’re on the topic of grad school, there is a great discussion over at Philosophy, et cetera on Getting the Most out of Grad School. The post is actually from last month, but it is definitely worth reading (especially for those who will be beginning their graduate studies this Fall). More About: Back
Naturalised Epistemology: Quine vs. Stroud (Part 1)
2007-07-13 16:33:00 The central difference between Quinean naturalised epistemology and traditional epistemology is located in Quine's rejection of first philosophy. Traditional epistemology is involved in the following two-fold task. First, traditional epistemology seeks to identify the regulating criterion for knowledge. Second, it tries to determine, based on this criterion, whether or not we truly have knowledge. This two-fold task is referred to as first philosophy because it is analytically prior to all of our sensory or empirical knowledge. In brief, traditional epistemology attempts to find the epistemic foundation and justification for all scientific knowledge.Quine believes that traditional epistemology's attempt to find a justification for knowledge outside of or prior to science has either failed or is moribund. Our only remaining hope of finding a validation for science is within science itself. Hence, Quine's now famous (or is that infamous?) declaration: "Epistemology , or something li... More About: Part , Ural , Stem
St Thomas or Bust
2007-07-03 09:47:00 I’m heading off to St Thom as to recharge my Caribbean batteries. A son of the sun like myself can spend only so much time in grey Scotland without going completely insane. Since I probably won’t have internet access for the duration of my trip my blog will be going on a brief hiatus. However, I will be back in about two weeks time.Sam, from over at Philosophy Hurts Your Head, has paid me the compliment of including the Space of Reasons on his top 5 open-minded bloggers list. I feel honoured! I will be posting my list of 5 when I get back.Until then… More About: Bust , St Thomas , Homa
The Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem (Carter)
2007-06-25 18:13:00 Note: The following is a cross-post written by J. Adam Cart er, from over at Virtue Epistemology.Goldman and Olsson (forthcoming) in “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge” offer several insightful responses to the ‘swamping problem.’ I think that the ‘conditional probability’ solution that they offer is the most interesting; evaluating this solution requires attention to some important, and sometimes unnoticed, aspects of the problem.The swamping problem has been articulated a variety of ways, and unfortunately, different versions of the problem have been referred to under the same label.Here’s a general and (hopefully) uncontroversial formulation of the problem, as presented by Goldman and Olsson:Template Swamping Argument(S1) Knowledge equals reliably produced true belief (simple reliabilism)(S2) If a given belief is true, its value will not be raised by the fact that it was reliably produced.(S3) Hence: knowledge is no more valuable than unreliably produced true b... More About: Problem , Ping , Carter , Probability
St Andrews 2007 Graduation Pictures
2007-06-22 11:40:00 are here. More About: Pictures , Graduation , Adua , Andrews , Drew
Defending the Lottery Argument (Part 2)
2007-06-18 10:56:00 In this post, I will address Aidan's second objection to my lottery argument. By his lights, even if we grant whatever closure (or conjunction) step I need to make the aforementioned inference, premise (A6) still seems in need of defence. For example, suppose that S, due to some introspective failure, does not recognise that what she may justifiably believe about this lottery has the form of (a*). This is consistent with S's recognizing that if she believed something which had the form (a*) she would be believing a set of inconsistent propositions.The upshot, according to Aidan, is that (A3) and (A4) might be true, and my opponent might grant me whatever I need to conclude from that that what S may justifiably believe about this lottery is (by (A5)) inconsistent. But even in the presence of (A6) that's not enough for (A7); it's not enough that S recognize that something of the form (a*) would be inconsistent – she must also recognise that what she may justifiably believe abou... More About: Lottery , Part , Otter
Defending the Lottery Argument (Part 1)
2007-06-11 10:43:00 Over the weekend I finally had the honour of meeting Aidan McGlynn, of The Boundaries of Language fame, who was one of the delegates at the Arché Vagueness Conference here at St Andrews. Aaron Bogart, from over at Struggling to Philosophize, was also at St Andrews over the weekend and promises to visit again later this summer. Looking forward to sharing a pint and a chin-wag with you again, Aaron.Now, down to business. In honour of Aidan’s very thoughtful comments, I’ve decided to dedicate this (and the upcoming) post to responding to his two objections to my lottery argument. Aidan's first objection is that my argument presupposes some type of closure principle. While he does not actually spell out any particular closure principle, given that my argument has to do with justification, he presumably has something akin to the following justification closure principle in mind:(JCP) If S may justifiably believe p and p entails q, and S competently deduces q from p and accep... More About: Lottery , Part , Otter
Richard Rorty, 1931-2007
2007-06-09 20:15:00 The following obit is taken from today's issue of Telos: Richard Rorty, the leading American philosopher and heir to the pragmatist tradition, passed away on Friday, June 8. He was Professor of Comparative Literature emeritus at Stanford University. In April the American Philosophical Society awarded him the Thomas Jefferson Medal. The prize citation reads: "In recognition of his influential and distinctively American contribution to philosophy and, more widely, to humanistic studies. His work redefined knowledge 'as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature' and thus redefined philosophy itself as an unending, democratically disciplined, social and cultural activity of inquiry, reflection, and exchange, rather than an activity governed and validated by the concept of objective, extramental truth." At the awards ceremony, presenter Lionel Gossman celebrated Dr. Rorty as an advocate of "a deeply liberal, democratic, and tru... More About: Char
The 48th Philosophers' Carnival
2007-06-06 16:05:00 is here! More About: Carnival , Hilo , Philosophers , Philosopher
Lottery Argument Against Defeasible Evidence
2007-06-04 10:01:00 This post is an updated version of one I published over at the Web of Belief.I wish to argue that it is a conceptual requirement of justification that it be factive. On this view, it is a conceptual requirement vis-à-vis some type or token reason {R}, that {R} may only justify a subject’s belief that p if {R} guarantees the truth of p. When {R} meets this stipulation, I will describe {R} as a factive reason for believing that p. I contrast having a factive reason for p with having evidence for p, in which evidence is essentially defeasible. Typically, when we describe some evidence {E} as defeasible, we mean that {E} may be evidence for p despite the fact that {E} ∪ {E*} is not evidence for p. In such a case, we would say that {E*} defeats {E}, or that {E*} is a defeater for {E}. In the discussion that follows, I will be using the expression ‘defeasible’ more broadly to refer to any evidence {E} for p, in which {E} fails to guarantee the truth of p. I take defeasibl... More About: Evidence , Lottery , Otter
The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamentalist (Round Two)
2007-05-27 11:28:00 John F. Hobbins, from over at Ancient Hebrew Poetry, has written a response to my post, The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamental ist. In my initial response to Hobbins I claimed that although (or perhaps because) he is a Methodist minister, his position is not a Biblical Fundamentalist one. I believe the reasons for my original assertion will become clear by the end of this post. More significantly, I will argue that even taken on its own terms, Hobbins' position has troubling implications, not only for Biblical Fundamentalism, but for any authoritative view of Christian scripture.Before delving into my reply to Hobbins, I want to quickly address Matt Nehls' reply to my anti-Fundamentalist argument. Both Hobbins and Nehls agree that the locution, “the Son of Man coming in the clouds”, actually refers to Israel’s apocalyptic victory over its enemies. Nehls posits that this interpretation hinges on the following claims:First, this passage is Matthew's redactional work... More About: Round , Hilo
Challenging the Swamping Premise (Carter)
2007-05-23 11:38:00 Note: The following is a cross-post written by J. Adam Cart er, from over at Virtue Epistemology. Adam has an on-going treatment of the swamping problem, so if that's your thing, be sure to check it out.The ‘swamping’ argument against reliabilism has been advanced on several occasions (i.e. Kvanvig 2003, Swinburne 1999, Zagzebski 2004, W. Jones 1997, and others), and is, at least prima facie, quite persuasive.The crucial premise in the argument is, as Kristoffer Ahlstrom (whose formalization I am using) calls it, the swamping premise.(1) V (SB R,T that p) = V (SBT that p).The swamping premise has been defended a variety of ways. Zagzebski (2004), for example, defends (1) with her ‘espresso analogy.’ She argues that good espresso from an unreliable espresso machine is just as valuable as good espresso from a reliable espresso machine. Analogously, she thinks, for beliefs. Being produced from a reliable process doesn’t add value to a true belief. And, thus, (1).Kvanvig (20... More About: Allen , Ping , Carter , Remi
Strongly Believe vs. Weakly Believe
2007-05-12 20:52:00 Note: This post was originally composed as a reply to Rachael's insightful comments in response to my post, “Probable But Unjustifiable”, over at the Web of Belief. The proposal I canvas is still rough and needs further ironing out. Any feedback is greatly appreciated. Occasionally, we use “I believe” to identify something we are certain about. For example, I believe that I am now thinking. Sometimes we use ‘I believe’ to describe something we are intellectually/ rationally/ doxastically committed to. For example, I believe that 1 + 1 = 2. Often we use ‘I believe’ to identify something we take ourselves to know. I believe I'm currently looking at a computer monitor. This is also something that I know! However, we frequently use ‘I believe’ to indicate something we merely hold to be likely. Consider the following exchange:A: “Is it 2:30pm yet?”B: “I'm not sure, but I believe it is.”B seems like a perfectly natural thing to say (though on at ... More About: Strong
The Philosopher vs. the Biblical Fundamentalist
2007-05-07 14:04:00 I realise that this post is a radical departure from the usual content of this blog, but I thought it would be fun to mix things up a little. Here, I will be presenting an argument against certain types of Biblical Fundamental ism—namely, those which hold to a literal interpretation of the Bible. The argument presented here was originally featured on one of my weblogs as a parody. But after receiving several email correspondences from Biblical Fundamentalist s attempting to refute my argument (quite unsuccessfully in my opinion), I am beginning to suspect that I may actually be on to something. My argument, simply stated, is that if Biblical literalism is true (a claim many Biblical Fundamentalist subscribe to) then Biblical Fundamentalism must be false.Let us define Biblical literalism as the claim that the Bible should be interpreted at face value, unless otherwise clearly indicated. On this view, the creation of the world by God, the parting of the red sea by Moses, the resur... More About: Hilo , Philosopher
Boghossian-Style Incompatibilism (Part 2)
2007-05-03 16:36:00 In my previous post I outline a reductio against compatibilism. However, I believe the compatibilist has good reason reject (R4) of the reductio. Underlying (R4) is the implicit assumption that a subject can only have privileged access to the fact that she is thinking some thought θ if she is able to distinguish it, from some other thought θ*, without consulting her environment. However, the compatibilist has good (independent) grounds to reject this assumption, and with it, (R4). For example, Falvey and Owens [1994] distinguish between ‘introspective knowledge of content’ and ‘introspective knowledge of comparative content’: (*) An individual knows the contents of his occurrent thoughts and beliefs authoritatively and directly (that is, without relying on inferences from observation of his environment). Call this kind of knowledge introspective knowledge of content. (**) With respect to any two of his thoughts or beliefs, and individual can know authoritatively... More About: Style , Part , Compa , Ossi
Boghossian-Style Incompatibilism (Part 1)
2007-04-26 11:18:00 Arguments against the compatibility of a priori self-knowledge and content externalism (henceforth, C-externalism) typically fall under one of two headings. First, there is the achievement problem, according to which C-externalism entails that a subject can only come to know the content of her thoughts by examining her environment, and the consequence problem, the charge that C-externalism (when combined with privileged self-knowledge) implies that a subject may have a priori knowledge of empirical facts about her environment.I will begin with an examination of the achievement problem. Roughly, the achievement problem may be put as follows: C-externalist thought experiments seem to demonstrate that given an appropriate difference in the external world, there will be a difference in thought content, without this difference being reflected in any inner detectable manner. This seems to imply that one cannot tell, without consulting the external world, which of two thoughts one is en... More About: Style , Part , Compa , Ossi
The 46th International Philosopher's Carnival
2007-04-23 15:56:00 A NARROW CROSS-SECTION OF PHILOSOPHYFROM ACROSS THE WEB A Philosophy (Pseudo) ConferenceHosted by the Space of ReasonsMonday, April 23rd, 2007Welcome to the 46th instalment of the Philosopher 's Carnival , which takes the form or a philosophy pseudo-conference, showcasing a narrow cross-section of philosophy on the web. A special thank you goes out to Professor Daniel Dennett for his submission, which raises important questions with regards to what constitutes a worthwhile philosophical research program. In the three "presentations" immediately following the "keynote address" (under the heading of METAPHILOSOPHY), two philosophy students and one non-philosopher share their views on the status and role of philosophical theories. We then turn to the heart and soul of the Carnival which features a number of “presentations” that fall under the heading of Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind (or LEMMINGS). Finally, we top it all off with a sprinkling of ETHICS and a bri... More About: International , Intern , Hilo
Causal vs. Rational Explanations (Part 3)
2007-04-12 16:52:00 In my post Causal vs Rational Explanations (Part 1) I suggest that the 'Fanatical Tom' objection seems to pose a problem of causal theorists regarding justification. There are two strategies, available to the causal theorist, for responding to this objection : STRATEGY1: Accept that the Tom has a justified belief, and tweak the causal requirement to reflect this fact.STRATEGY2: Reject the assumption that Tom has a justified belief. I believe the considerations presented in my previous post on this topic, Causal vs. Rational Explanations (Part 2), represent a genuine difficulty for attempts to defend causal theories along the lines of strategy1. More specifically, I regard all attempts to argue that the spyware causally sustains Alvin’s believe via an appeal to the notion of a counterfactual cause are moribund.I now wish to propose an alternative reply, along the lines of STRATEGY2, for arguing that Tom’s belief is not justified. We begin with a few distinctions. First, w... More About: Part 3 , Plan
Philosopher's Carnival: Call For Submissions
2007-04-02 02:00:00 The next edition of the Philosopher 's Carnival (April 23rd), which will be hosted here at the Space of Reasons, will focus on epistemology (broadly understood), philosophy of mind, and the intersections between the two (e.g., philosophy of perception). However, blog posts in other areas of analytic philosophy are also welcome. Submissions should be roughly equivalent to one or two single spaced pages in length. Ideally, a post should engage a single issue or question and may be argumentative or descriptive. For an example of the overall tone we will be aiming for in the upcoming Carnival, click here. Submissions may be made here. More About: Call , Mission , Hilo
Causal vs. Rational Explanations (Part 2)
2007-03-28 08:38:00 In my previous post on this topic, I briefly touched on a common reply to Lehrer’s Gypsy-Lawyer type cases—namely, the suggestion that a belief need not have its ‘causal origin’ in a reliable process, so long as it is ‘causally sustained’ by such a process. On this more moderate view, Tom’s belief can be seen as ‘causally sustained’ by the discovery of the spyware in the sense that if Tom were to give up his fanatical religious views, he would still continue to believe that ‘the NSA is spying on US citizens’ (henceforth ‘SPY’). In this post I will examine one way of unpacking the concept of what it means for a belief to be causally sustained by some bit of evidence (whether propositionally or non-propositionally understood)—namely, Marshall Swain’s notion of a counterfactual cause. We may define a counterfactual in terms of possible world semantics. Following Lewis let us say that the truth of the statement A > B consists in the fact that, among po... More About: Part , Rational , Plan , Causal , Ausa
McDowell’s Direct Realist Reply to Scepticism
2007-03-20 10:26:00 McDowell’s claim that in veridical cases of perception objects are “immediately present to the mind” has earned him the title of direct realist. Dire ct realism is the thesis that what we perceive are not merely appearances (insert: sense data, veil or ideas or whatever else suits your fancy) but rather objects themselves.Direct realism can be used against an evidential argument of the following form:P1: Our EW beliefs are based on sense data beliefs P2: Sense data beliefs cannot justify EW beliefsEWS: Our EW beliefs are not justified The direct realist resists EWS (i.e., external world scepticism) by rejecting P1. There are two senses in which the direct realist can maintain that our EW beliefs are not based on sense data beliefs. First, they can deny that there are such things as sense data beliefs. This is certainly true in McDowell’s case since his rejection of the highest common factor view, a fortiori, includes the eschewal of any such mediating beliefs. Second... More About: Well , Rect
Gettierising Nozick
2007-03-08 23:35:00 Over at The Web of Belief, I lay out a Gettier case against local reliabilism (which is itself based on an earlier post of mine, Undescriminating Reliabilism). Let's call my proposed Gettier case against local reliabilism GLR. The version of local reliability I took as my target was admittedly quite simple, so here I will attempt to apply GLR to a much more sophisticated version of local reliability—namely, Nozick’s counterfactual account. Nozick [1981, p. 179] argues that the true belief that p is knowledge only if:(N1) If p were true, then S would believe that p(N2) If p were not true, then S would not believe that p1 Following David Lewis [1973] we may say that (N1) and (N2) are true, as counterfactual statements, iff in possible worlds near to the actual world, if p is true, S believes that p, and if p is false S does not believe that p. Nozick recommends that we assess (N1) and (N2) by reference to what is the case in all nearby possible worlds. Roughly, a world may... More About: Tier
Causal vs. Rational Explanations (Part 1)
2007-03-01 16:02:00 According to many J-externalists, a belief is only justified if it is caused in the right sort of way (for example, by a reliable process). Thus, we arrive at (J-Ext[C]):(J-Ext[C]) For any agent S, S’s belief that p is justified IFF it is caused in the appropriate way by the fact that p. In this post I will like to argue against this claim. I begin by distinguishing between two types of explanations of why someone might hold a certain belief—namely, causal and rational. Consider the following example:The ‘Crazy Jack’ Counterexample: Jack is convinced that alien creatures from a distant galaxy regularly abduct and perform bizarre experiments on him. We ask Jack’s psychiatrist why he has this belief, and the psychiatrist responds ‘because he has sush-and-such physical defect in his brain.’ There are two ways of interpreting the psychiatrist’s answer. First, we may view it as giving a causal explanation of Jack’s belief. On this interpretation, Jack need not be awar... More About: Part , Rational , Plan , Causal , Ausa
What (Else) is Going On...
2007-02-23 08:50:00 First, I should call everyone's attention to the most recent issue of the Philosopher's Carnival, here, which is being hosted by Trent Dougherty. I'm really liking the tone and quality of posts in the most recent Carnivals, especially the previous issue, here. Let's hope these high quality Carnivals continue.Update: In the comments of the Carnival there is a short exchange between Trent and Clayton Littlejohn about my post, in which Clayton comes to my defence. Surprise, surprise...I happen to agree with Clayton on this one (even if I am somewhat of an 'innie').Second, all you McDowell fans can find an interesting paper, here, by Adam who brings the theoretical apparatus of Virtue Epistemology to bear on McDowell's theory of knowledge.Third, I owe a word of gratitude to Brian Leiter for mentioning my blog on his Leiter Reports. During the week my blog was featured I had over 900 new visitors! Hopefully this increase in blog traffic will eventually translate into more feedba... More About: Else , Going , Goin
The Wright Objection
2007-02-13 22:52:00 Following J. M. Hinton [1973], Paul Snowdon [1990] has argued that indistinguishable veridical and hallucinatory perceptual experiences belong to fundamentally different genera. Thus, veridical perceptual experiences (henceforth e1) are of one sort while hallucinatory perceptual experiences (henceforth e2) are of another fundamentally different sort, the only thing common to both being that they are introspectively indistinguishable from each other. The difference between e1 and e2 is, for Snowdon, is rooted in the fact that perceptual experiences are essentially relational.John McDowell takes up Snowdon’s disjunctive conception and applies its insights to epistemological questions relating to our perceptual beliefs.1 According to McDowell, the epistemological upshot of the disjunction between e1 and e2 is that e1 places us in a better epistemic position than e2 does. On its own, this claim hardly seems controversial. For example, a reliabilist would agree that e1 places us ... More About: Wright
Moore On Sense Data
More articles from this author:2007-02-04 12:43:00 One of the central questions in the philosophy of perception is: what are the objects of perception? One way to interpret the locution ‘objects of perception’ is in terms of what it is that we are immediately aware of in the act of perceiving. In the early 20th century the traditional answer to this question was ‘sense data’ (henceforth SD). Thus, Moore defines SD as that which we ‘directly apprehend’ in perception [p. 46 ff*]. A striking feature of Moore’s account of SD is that he appears to remain open to the possibility that SD are mind-independent [p. 31, 43-5]. For example, Moore opines that SD may continue to exist even when we do not perceive them [p. 31], in which case their existence would not be dependent on the mind of the perceiver. In this regard, Moore’s conception of SD differs slightly from that of most contemporary philosophers who view mind-dependence as a fundamental feature of SD (a fact which Moore [p. 40-3] himself acknowledges). Moore poi... More About: Sense , Data , Sens 1, 2 |
 |
|
 |
